A World in Transition: What the New Global Order Means for the Caribbean- Part One

By Dr. Livingston Smith

There are moments in international affairs when events that first appeared as separate events, begin to reveal themselves as parts of a larger historical transformation. The end of the Second World War reshaped the political and economic architecture of the globe, bringing new superpowers to the forefront and establishing institutions that would govern international security and finance for decades. The Bretton Woods Institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO come to mind as well as the United Nations, the IAEA, etcetera.

The subsequent dismantling of European colonial empires transformed the political map as formerly colonised peoples secured independence. Independence movements took seriously Kwame Nkrumah’s injunction to “seek ye first the political kingdom.” Yet the end of formal colonial rule did not necessarily dismantle the economic relationships through which imperial power had operated. Political sovereignty was a profound achievement, but economic autonomy and sustained economic success remained an unfinished project.

Might we be living through another such moment of transformation?

Between 1989 and 1991, the collapse of communist governments in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War’s defining rivalry between the then two superpowers. What followed was an extraordinary concentration of international power in the United States. China had not yet acquired its present economic weight. India was beginning a major process of economic reform as it adopted liberalization, privatization globalization.Russia was struggling with the consequences of Soviet implosion.

For a time, Washington possessed no comparable global competitor. John Mearsheimer, the American international-relations scholar and leading exponent of offensive realism, describes this post-Cold War configuration as unipolarity: a system in which the United States stood as the sole great power. The phrase “unipolar moment,” popularised by commentator Charles Krauthammer, captured this exceptional concentration of power.

American military strength, economic influence and institutional reach reinforced one another. There was considerable confidence that expanding markets and liberal institutions would shape the international future. Though some remained suspicious, globalisation appeared capable of drawing more countries into an increasingly integrated economic system, even where their political arrangements differed.

That confidence has weakened. Are we witnessing a difficult period within the American-led order, or a deeper redistribution of power that is producing a fundamentally different international system? And what might this mean for the Anglophone Caribbean?

Before answering, we should ask what we mean by a world order. Here, I believe that a Caribbean intellectual tradition offers a useful perspective. Leading thinkers in the Caribbean dependency tradition—Lloyd Best, Kari Polanyi Levitt, George Beckford and Norman Girvan—examined how societies could participate in the international economy while exercising limited control over the forces shaping their development.

Their approaches differed. Best and Levitt’s plantation economy framework explored relationships between metropolitan centres and subordinate economies. Beckford examined the institutional and social foundations of persistent underdevelopment. Girvan investigated foreign capital and the relationship between corporate interests and national development.

Their work encourages us to understand where power resides: in military capabilities, but also in ownership, finance, technology and the authority to make consequential economic decisions.

Applied to the present transition, this raises an important question. Will additional centres of power give more societies meaningful influence over their development, or mainly widen the range of powerful states and corporations upon which they depend? These thinkers were not predicting today’s geopolitical configuration. Their value lies in helping us distinguish a redistribution of power among the strongest from a transformation in the position of those with less power.

The weakening of unipolarity and the overcoming of dependency are different propositions. The first may create opportunities for the second, but it cannot guarantee it.

In this changing international landscape, China’s industrial capacity, trading relationships and technological capabilities have made it central to the world economy. Its growing military strength also challenges established American predominance, particularly in Asia. How both countries manage that competition will have consequences far beyond their borders- waning superpowers do not historically give way without a struggle.

Yet the emerging picture cannot be reduced to a contest between Washington and Beijing. India seeks a greater role in international affairs while preserving freedom to pursue relationships across geopolitical divisions. Russia challenges the European security order, although its military influence should not be confused with economic strength comparable to that of China or the United States. Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Indonesia and other influential states also pursue objectives that do not fit neatly into a single global alignment.

This is one reason the term “multipolarity” requires care especially for small, dependent countries. A world with several influential states is not necessarily a world with several equally capable global powers. Military strength, financial influence, industrial production and technological leadership may be distributed differently. A country can be powerful in one domain and dependent in another.

BRICS illustrates this changing landscape. Named after its original members—Brazil, Russia, India and China, subsequently joined by South Africa—the expanded grouping provides a platform through which developing countries seek greater influence over international institutions and economic cooperation.

Its September 2026 New Delhi Declaration connected a multipolar world with demands for more equitable global governance and stronger participation by developing countries. It also reaffirmed support for a reformed multilateral trading system. Its significance lies in the effort to widen participation in shaping international rules, although its members’ differing interests prevent it from being treated as a single geopolitical bloc.

Regional security initiatives provide another indication of this search for options. The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan establishes a framework for closer defence cooperation. Its participants have described it as compatible with existing commitments rather than a replacement for them. Such arrangements suggest that states increasingly seek additional partnerships while retaining established ones.

The recent UN debate also raised questions about how this changing world should be governed. Secretary-General António Guterres identified movement towards multipolarity while calling for cooperation against fragmentation. Barbados’ Prime Minister Mia Mottley connected institutional reform with representation and questioned whether technological progress would reproduce existing inequalities of access and power.  She argued that UN reform must address power and representation, including Africa’s exclusion from permanent Security Council membership and the position of small island states

These interventions highlight an important distinction. Multipolarity concerns the distribution of power; multilateralism concerns how states cooperate and establish rules for its exercise. More centres of influence could widen diplomatic possibilities. They could also produce sharper rivalries, competing spheres of influence and greater insecurity. The political character of the emerging order therefore matters as much as the number of its powerful participants.

How the world is organised and who holds power matter greatly to Caribbean countries. The unipolar order is under increasing strain. What replaces it is still being contested. For the Caribbean what eventually becomes the global norm concerns the terms on which we obtain investment, finance development, access technology and protect our sovereignty.

A wider range of international partners could create greater room for manoeuvre. But sharper competition could also expose our small states to new pressures and dependencies. The question is whether we can turn greater choice into greater control over our own development.

This brings us back to the challenge posed by Caribbean dependency thinkers that I had invoked earlier. A changing world will not automatically secure a stronger Caribbean. That will require deliberate choices, greater regional cooperation and a clear understanding of our interests. What those choices should be and why CARICOM may become even more necessary in this emerging order is the subject of the next article.